Algorithmic How-Possibly Explanation

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Landscape of explanatory concepts



Pluralism

- Causal explanation
- Mechanistic explanation
- Mathematical explanation

- Structural explanation
- How-actually explanation
- How-possibly explanation

Etc.

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Outline

- 1. Different senses of how-possibly explanation
- 2. Algorithmic how-possibly explanation
- 3. Mechanistic explanation, structural explanation
- 4. Relation between mechanistic, structural, and algorithmic how-possibly explanation

• Dray (1957): HPEs dispel "puzzlement"



" 'It's a long fly ball to centre field, and it's going to hit high up on the fence. The centre fielder's back, he's under it, he's caught it, and the batter is out.' " [Radio] Listeners who knew the fence was twenty feet high couldn't figure out how the fielder caught the ball" (p. 158 Dray, 1957).

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"Spectators could have given the unlikely explanation. At the rear of centre field was a high platform for the scorekeeper. The centre fielder ran up the ladder and caught the ball twenty feet above the ground" (Dray, 1957, p. 158).

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- Persson (2012): HPEs fill in the gaps in partial sketches of actual mechanisms
- Cuffaro (2015): Algorithmic HPEs

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- Hard problems:
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 - \cdot E.g., $\approx k^n$ steps in the worst case.
- Finer-grained complexity classes
 - \cdot linear: $\approx n$ steps in the worst case
 - \cdot quasi-linear: $\approx n\log n$ steps in the worst case
 - etc.

SelectionSort:

- $\cdot n(n-1)/2$ comparisons
- \cdot I.e., " $O(n^2)$ ".

SelectionSort:

 $\cdot n(n-1)/2$ comparisons \cdot l.e., "O(n²)".

MergeSort:

 $\cdot \ O(n\log n).$

How is it that my computer sorts integers faster than yours?

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How-actually explanation

"My account has the somewhat counterintuitive consequence that one can move from a rather well-confirmed how-actually explanation ... at a high level of abstraction ... to a how-possibly model explanation as one tries to fill in some of the further details of that mechanism" (Bokulich, 2014, p. 335).

Coarse-grained description:



How-actually

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Detailed description?



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Detailed description?



- Look at the code

```
void SelectionSort(int intsToSort[], int lengthOfList) {
 // Declare list indices:
 int i, j, indexOfLowestNum;
 // For each position in the list,
 for (i = 0; i < \text{lengthOfList} - 1; i++) {
    // provisionally assert that it points to the lowest number,
    indexOfLowestNum = i:
    // and then for each of the other list positions,
    for (j = \text{lengthOfList} - 1; j > i; j - -)
      // if the number pointed to by it is less than the number
      // pointed to by indexOfLowestNum,
      if (intsToSort[j] < intsToSort[indexOfLowestNum]) {
        // then make this the new provisional minimum index.
        indexOfLowestNum = j;
    // At the end of the ith iteration, put the number that is in the
    // indexOfLowestNum position into the ith position (and vice versa).
    Swap(&intsToSort[i], &intsToSort[indexOfLowestNum]);
```


```
// on the first call, low = 0, high = n - 1
void Partition(int arr[], int low, int high) {
  // divide the list in two
  int mid:
  if (low < high)
    mid = (low + high) / 2;
    // recursively call partition function on
    // both halves of the list
    Partition(arr, low, mid);
    Partition(arr, mid + 1, high);
    // once the list is partitioned, call the
    // main merge sort procedure
    MergeSort(arr, low, mid, high);
void MergeSort(int arr[], int low,
                 int mid,int high) {
  int i, m, k, l, temp[MAX];
  I = Iow:
  i = low:
  m = mid+1:
  while ((I \le mid) \&\& (m \le high))
    if (arr[l] \le arr[m])
      temp[i] = arr[l];
```

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else {
    temp[i] = arr[m];
if(l > mid)
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What does this code represent?

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Space of possibilities

• The <u>pathways available</u> to MergeSort allow for quicker running times than the pathways available to SelectionSort.




MergeSort

SelectionSort

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MergeSort

SelectionSort

• They explain how-possibly.

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Characteristic examples

- Comparisons between (not necessarily abstract) algorithmic processes
 - Why is A more than B?

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• Railton's DNP model

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"The goal of understanding the world is a theoretical goal, and if the world is a machine—a vast arrangement of nomic connections—then our theory ought to give us some insight into the structure and workings of the mechanism, above and beyond the capability of predicting and controlling its outcomes" (Railton, 1978, p. 208).

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- Railton's DNP model
 - What is a mechanism?
 - Describable in terms of lawlike statements / D-N style argument.
 - · Deliberately vague

"Calling for an account of the mechanism leaves open the nature of that account, and as far as I can see, the model explanations offered in scientific texts are D-N when complete, D-N sketches when not" (Railton, 1978, p. 208).

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 - Mark transmission (Salmon, 1984); invariant quantity (Salmon, 1994); conserved quantity (Salmon, 1997).

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- description of a mechanism's behaviour

- description of what accounts for this behaviour

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Mechanistic explanation

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Cf. Anderson (2014a,b), Piccinini (2007), Craver (2007), etc.

"New Mechanism"

- Anti-reductionist
- Metaphysically agnostic

"It is not explicitly anti-metaphysical but rather metaphysically agnostic. The anti-reductive character of $Mechanism_1$ allows us to make methodological recommendations about investigating the world ... without thereby committing ourselves to a single account of what that world is like" (Anderson, 2014a, p. 276).

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 - E.g. Minkowskian representation of spacetime as an explanation of relativistic effects
- Anti-metaphysical
 - No presuppositions regarding underlying entities and dynamical processes

Mechanistic vs structural explanation

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Hughes (1989b)

- SE, unlike ME, is anti-metaphysical
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Felline (2015)

- SE, unlike ME, is non-mechanistic
 - No account of underlying entities and dynamical processes
 - SE not necessarily non-metaphysical?

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• Structural explanation?




MergeSort



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• Structural explanation?



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Distinct type (appears to be):

- Shares features with both types of explanation
- But differs from each

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Works Cited

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Thanks!